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Prepublication disclosure of scientific results:
Norms, competition, and commercial orientation
Jerry G. Thursby,1,2 Carolin Haeussler,3 Marie C. Thursby,1,4,5,6* Lin Jiang7,8
On the basis of a survey of 7103 active faculty researchers in nine fields, we examine the extent to which scien-
tists disclose prepublication results, and when they do, why? Except in two fields, more scientists disclose
results before publication than not, but there is significant variation in their reasons to disclose, in the frequen-
cy of such disclosure, and in withholding crucial results when making public presentations. They disclose results
for feedback and credit and to attract collaborators. Particularly in formulaic fields, scientists disclose to attract
new researchers to the field independent of collaboration and to deter others from working on their exact
problem. A probability model shows that 70% of field variation in disclosure is related to differences in respondent
beliefs about norms, competition, and commercialization. Our results suggest new research directions—for example,
do the problems addressed or the methods of scientific production themselves shape norms and competition? Are
the levels we observe optimal or simply path-dependent? What is the interplay of norms, competition, and com-
mercialization in disclosure and the progress of science?
INTRODUCTION
Scientific progress and open, timely disclosure of results go hand in
hand. In principle, the Mertonian norm that scientific discoveries be-
long to the community, coupledwith the priority rule that credit belongs
to the first to discover a result, ensures open and timely disclosure of
results (1–3). Open disclosure enables researchers to build on each
other’s work, minimizes duplication of effort, and facilitates collabora-
tion, feedback, and verification (4, 5).However, before publication, scien-
tists who disclose their results risk being scooped by competitors in the
race to publish. Those whose research has commercial potential may
have incentives to keep results from the public domain before patenting,
and researchers supported by industry may be required to delay or not
publish certain results. We see the tension between prepublication dis-
closure and secrecy in discussions of preprints in the biological sciences,
particularly in the more competitive areas (6, 7). Anecdotally, pre-
publication disclosure is avoided in some subfields of physics, a field
in which posting preprints has been a norm for decades (for example,
ArXiv), and in computer sciences, researchers have been known to dis-
close results only on the day of journal submission (3). With a time
stamp, preprint servers can establish priority (albeit not validation) in
fields with long lags in peer-reviewed publication (8, 9).
Although there is extensive research anddebate on sharing academic
science in general (10–21), we know little about open disclosure before
publication. There is a rich tradition of survey research on the failure of
scientists to respond to requests for data or materials (10–14) and on
their reluctance to discuss current research for fear of being scooped
(12, 15, 16). Neither strand of research has examined the question of
open disclosure. Materials exchange is not disclosure because requests
for materials presume knowledge of their existence. Regarding dis-
comfort in discussing research, it is not clear whether the discussion
is with one or many scientists. An exception is the study of Haeussler
et al. (17), which shows that the incentives and trade-offs for sharing
one-to-one information or material sharing are quite different from
those motivating general, public presentation of results before pub-
lication. Whereas expectations of reciprocity govern the former,
concerns over misappropriation and potential feedback govern the
latter. There is research on “disclosure,” but the term is taken to mean
publication. Papers in this stream either study withholding or publica-
tion delays (12, 18–20) or theoretically model the researcher’s dilemma
on when to publish (21). Thus, research on prepublication open disclo-
sure is neglected, leaving the public debates largely uninformed.
Filling this gap is our interest.We ask, given the risks of being scooped,
why do those who disclose do so? Do they tend to withhold crucial re-
sults so that the disclosure ismore apparent than real?How is disclosure
related to individual characteristics and research profiles? How is it re-
lated to perceived norms and competition, or commercial orientation?
Further, although the bulk of previous research has focused largely on
life sciences [with select work on secrecy in mathematics and physics
(15, 16)], we examine open disclosure across a wide array of fields.
Our analysis is based on survey responses and publication data for
7103 active faculty researchers in the United States, Germany, and
Switzerland across nine fields as measured by department/school affil-
iation. Collectively, these researchers have 136,815 publications over the
period 2010–2014, which had received 1,217,437 citations by 2017. De-
partment or school affiliations are agriculture, biological science, com-
puter science, engineering, mathematics, medical school basic science,
medical school clinical, physical science, and social science. Survey de-
tails and analysis of response bias are in Methods.
Wemake three contributions to the literature on scientific disclosure
before publication. First, for a publication in an area considered im-
portant to the respondent’s research portfolio, we report whether the
respondent openly disclosed the results before publication and, if so,
the motivation and stage of the research when disclosed. Confirming
our initial hypotheses, we find that the fear of being scooped (an ele-
ment of competition) is related to whether the results were disclosed
prepublication and, if disclosed, at what stage. Among the reasons for
disclosing, we examine obtaining credit before another group could
disclose a similar result because the fear of being scooped may
prompt disclosure rather than waiting for publication. We also ex-
amine feedback, attracting collaborators, attracting others to work on
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their research problem, and deterring others fromworking on their part
of the problem. Across all fields, obtaining feedback is the most impor-
tant and deterrence is the least important, but there is substantial field
variation among the other motivations, with the more formulaic fields
disclosing more for credit, as well as attracting others to work on the
problem, while at the same time attempting to deter others from their
part of the problem.
Second, we construct ordinal indices of researcher disclosure “types,”
which reflect how often respondents present unpublished or unpatented
results to general audiences and how often crucial parts are withheld
when presenting. We define disclosure to general audiences to include
web postings, preprints, and conferences. By including the frequency of
withholding critical results, the index captures the fact that scientists
avoid disclosing not only by not presenting but also by withholding in
presentation. This inclusion for prepublication presentation is in the
same spirit as Blumenthal et al.’s attention towithholding in publications
(10, 12). As in the results on disclosure of a particular paper, we find
substantial variation across fields.
Third, on the basis of a probability model and series of sensitivity
exercises, we show that 70% of the field differences in disclosure types
are correlated with (that is, statistically explained by) variables reflecting
norms, competition, and commercial orientation, which we collectively
call the NCC variables. These three sets of variables embody the tension
between the Mertonian norm, with its expected positive impact on dis-
closure, andnegative incentives presented by competition and commer-
cial potential. Further, we show that the observed field variation in
disclosure is not related to marginal (partial) effects of the NCC varia-
bles; instead, field differences are related to levels of the NCC variables
across fields. The model includes a variety of measures of respondent
perceptions of norms, competition, commercial orientation, as well as
demographics such as age and rank, productivity measures such as pub-
lications and citations, characteristics of research profile such as basic
research or interdisciplinary direction, size of the research group, and
field fixed effects.
The analysis stands inmarked contrast to previous work not only in
relating the NCC variables to open disclosure prepublication but also in
capturingmultiple ways in which researchers perceive norms and com-
petition or are engaged in commercial activities. In terms of norms, we
introduce variables to reflect respondent perceptions of the extent to
which researchers in their field openly disclose results before publica-
tion, whether they receive valuable feedback when presenting to general
audiences, and ameasure of the norm-based system of protecting intel-
lectual property by which researchers are expected to acknowledge
authors when using their results (22, 23). Regarding competition, scien-
tists who present before publication risk providing competitors with
information to scoop them in the race to publish, a loss evenwith proper
acknowledgement. Whereas previous studies have measured competi-
tion only by indices centered on the fear of being scooped (15, 16), we
use a number of measures of competition. One such measure is the
respondent perceptions of competition to publish. Although influencing
the public is an important goal for some scientists, publishing remains
the holy grail for many, if not all (24, 25).We also include the number of
other researchersworking on the same problemas the respondent in line
with the economic notion of competition. Notably, we include respondent
perceptions of the priority rule in science, the esteem associated with
being the first to discover a result (3, 26). In addition, we include
respondent perceptions of the level of competition for government
funding and students, and the extent to which they choose topics based
on the likelihood of funding. Regarding commercial orientation, in ad-
dition to the commonly used measures (patents, startups, and industry
funding), we include an additional, and ex ante, commercialization var-
iable to reflect the extent to which respondents choose their research for
its commercial potential.
RESULTS
Prepublication disclosure: When? Why?
Weasked respondents to think about the problems currently researched
in their group.Among those, theywere to identify one overarching prob-
lem they view as particularly important and to select one publication
coming out of their research on the problem. The results in this section
are with reference to that publication.
Consider first whether respondents disclosed results from the proj-
ect to a general audience (for example, web posting, preprint, or confer-
ences) before publication. Figure 1A shows by field the stages of first
disclosure: conceptual, after being sure of the validity of the results,
completion of a draft or submission, and after publication. Overall,
67.2% of the respondents reported disclosing before publication. Only
6.35%disclosed to a general audience at the concept stage. Roughly 40%
disclosed after they were sure of the validity, and 21.4% disclosed once
there was a paper, either in draft form or after submission. This leaves
roughly one-third who did not disclose prepublication. There is sub-
stantial field variation, with the computer scientists and engineers least
likely to disclose prepublication. Social scientists are the most likely to
disclose at the conceptual stage.
Figure 1B relates the stage of disclosure to respondent concerns over
whether the disclosure might lead a competitor to complete a larger re-
search question before them. As the level of concern increases, the per-
cent disclosing at concept or validity falls, whereas the fraction who did
not disclose prepublication rises. Relatively few of those who disclosed
before publication reported being quite concerned. Roughly 70% of
those who said they were very concerned did not disclose until publi-
cation. More than half of those who were not concerned at all disclosed
at the concept stage or once they were sure of validity.
For those who disclosed results prepublication, we asked the impor-
tance (coded1=not important to 5=very important) for eachof five, non-
mutually exclusive objectives: to obtain feedback, obtain credit before
another group can disclose a similar result, attract collaborators, attract
others to work on the problem, and deter others from working on this
part of the problem. Although attracting others to work on a problem
and attracting collaborators might be considered as the same for some
respondents, in our presurvey interviews, several interviewees noted
that they disclose primarily to attract others towork in their area, though
not as collaborators. Computer scientists said there was a reputational
benefit to starting new research directions; both they and mathema-
ticians mentioned wanting others to work on problems they could
not solve. Many respondents viewed these reasons as distinct because
48.4% of respondents gave different answers on attracting collaborators
and attracting others to work in the field.
Figure 1C gives the importance of objectives by field; it shows aver-
age responses by field. There is little variation in the importance of feed-
back by field, with feedback being the most important motive. For
feedback, only agriculture is significantly different from other fields.
For deterrence, mathematics is significantly different from all fields ex-
cept computer science and medical school basic. Obtaining credit is
most important for computer science, engineering, mathematics, and
physical sciences—notably the most formulaic fields. Obtaining credit
is least important for agriculture, which is significantly different from all
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Fig. 1. Disclosure of an identified paper. (A) Stages of disclosure to general audience by field. (B) Stages of disclosure and concern of being scooped. (C) Motivation
for disclosure by field.
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other fields except social sciences. Attracting collaborators is least im-
portant for social scientists and most important in computer science,
engineering, andboth clinical andbasicmedical school research.Attract-
ing others to work on a problem has the greatest variation across fields.
Computer scientists andmathematicians (not statistically different at the
5% level) attach the most importance to this reason, and biological
sciences the least.
One seemingly contradictory observation is that computer scien-
tists and mathematicians are higher than other fields in both attracting
others to work on “this problem” and deterring others from working on
their “part” of the problem. Further, the same respondents can be high
in both. Slightly less than 19% of computer scientists and mathema-
ticians responded that deterrence was moderately to very important,
and 70% of these respondents indicated that attracting others was
moderately to very important. Informal discussions with researchers
in these fields suggest that the reason follows from the formulaic na-
ture of both computer science and mathematics. The formulaic nature
allows researchers to more concretely communicate their exact part of
the problem and to more easily differentiate their part of the problem
from other parts.
Disclosing types
There are two ways to not disclose results: not to present them and,
when presenting, to withhold crucial parts. We create an ordinal index
of disclosing type that reflects both approaches. Our index uses respon-
dent answers to two questions: (i) how often they present to general
audiences and (ii) how often they withhold crucial parts when pres-
enting. Table S1 (parts a and b) shows responses.
Non-disclosers or non-disclosing (ND) type are defined as research-
ers who report that they never or rarely present prepublication mate-
rial to general colleagues and/or, when presenting, often or very often
withhold crucial parts. Disclosers or disclosing (D) types are identified
by responses that they often or very often present and never or rarely
withhold crucial parts. D typesmust satisfy two conditions, whereasND
types must satisfy only one of two conditions. Ambivalent disclosing
(AD) types consist of all others. We examine validity of this classifica-
tion in Methods.
The ND group is 23.9% of the sample, AD is 38.9%, and D is 37.2%
of respondents. In the population, ND types may be less likely to re-
spond to the survey, and we find that ND types are less likely to
complete the survey once started than D types. This implies the possi-
bility that ND types in the population are more prevalent than in our
sample. Response bias is considered in Methods.
As shown in Fig. 2, the percentages above mask considerable field
heterogeneity. ND varies from 11.8% in social sciences to 35.3% in en-
gineering. Biological science, which has attracted most attention, is not
an extreme by our measure. Except for engineering and computer sci-
ence, D exceeds ND, with the ratio greater than two for mathematics
and social sciences. As shown in section S1 and fig. S1, significant field
heterogeneity also extends to responses across the 27 Scopus publica-
tion fields in which respondents published. In the next sections, we
focus on the heterogeneity in disclosing type across fields as determined
by department/school affiliation.
Probability of disclosing
We use an ordered logit model relating the probability of respondent
type (ND, AD, or D coded 0, 1, or 2, respectively) to variables thought
to be related to disclosing and field fixed effects to account for un-
observed heterogeneity. The variables considered are defined in Table 1,
with summary statistics in table S2 and additional details of variable
construction in section S2. Fourteen of the 39 independent variables
included are NCC variables. Together, the NCC variables reflect the
tension of the norms of science (N) with competition (C) and com-
mercial orientation (C). In the theoretical model of Haeussler et al.
(17), an increase in a scientist’s confidence that others will acknowl-
edge results and other scientific norms should lead to an increase in
general disclosure. By contrast, any of the variables reflecting
increased competition are expected to decrease the likelihood of general
disclosure (15–17). Similarly, we expect academic researchers whose re-
search is commercially oriented to be less likely to openly disclose the
results before publication or patenting (15–17).
Table 1A gives the results, expressed as odds ratios, for the ordered
logit when all 39 variables are included. Table 1B gives the results after
excluding variables with very small t statistics (<1). We consider this
model as our base model and discuss all results with respect to this
model. It is noteworthy that respondent publications and citations as
well as measures of the size of their research group have small t statistics
and thus are dropped. The only regressors of the reduced model not
significantly different from zero at a 10% level or less areMale and
SumResAreas. Because the age of the respondent enters both as the level
and as the square, we jointly testedAge andAgeSq and accepted the null
hypothesis that they are jointly not different from zero (P = 0.202). All
else equal, the more laboratory members or collaborators working with
a scientist, the less the need for feedback from the external community
(17). Variables in the regression that could reflect such feedback
possibilities are the number of groups worldwide in which respondents
had a trusted colleague (GrpWWTrust) and the number of these in
which they had a collaborator (GrpWWCollab). Whereas the former
increases disclosure, the latter is found to decrease it.
The model should not be viewed as causal, but as descriptive, pro-
viding partial correlations of variables thought to be associated with dis-
closure. However, the issue of endogeneity is worth discussing. Of the
variables of interest, those most likely to suffer from endogeneity are
respondent perceptions of norms; for example, respondent perceptions
of the norms of others in their field are likely to be affected by their own
norms. With this in mind, we examined endogeneity of norms; details
are found in section S2. With reservations detailed in the Supplemen-
taryMaterials, we suggest that endogeneity of norms can be discounted.
The NCC variables (with one exception) have odds ratios in line
with our expectations. Regarding norms, we would expect a belief that
Fig. 2. Fraction of disclosing and non-disclosing types by field.
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Table 1. Ordered logit results. OpenExch, open exchange is practiced in my field (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); Feedback, disclosing leads to valuable feedback
(1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); Acknowl, researchers use the results of others without acknowledgement (1 to 5, 5 = strongly disagree); ResCommer, choose research
topics with commercial potential (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); LStartup, log of number of startups with respondent as founder or member, scientific advisory
group; LPatentAp, log of number of patent applications; DIndustry, indicator equal to 1 if respondent has industry-funded research in the past 3 years;
CompOverall, perception of overall competition (1 to 5, 5 = very competitive); CompPub, perception of competition to publish or present new results (1 to 5,
5 = very competitive); CompGovFnd, perception of competition for government research funding (1 to 5, 5 = very competitive); CompStudents, perception
of competition for students or post docs (1 to 5, 5 = very competitive); ResFunded, choose research depending on how likely to get funded (1 to 5, 5 = strongly
agree); HighEsteem, first to come up with a result is highly esteemed by peers (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); GrpWW, number of competing groups worldwide
(capped at 51); GrpWWTrust, number of competing groups worldwide with trusted colleagues; GrpWWCollab, number of competing groups worldwide with
collaborators; DetectEasy, easy to detect failure to acknowledge (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); ResLeader, my research group is considered to be among the leaders in
the field (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); Lpubs, log of number of publications in the past 5 years; Lcites, log of number of citations in the past 5 years; NSF_DFG,
indicator = 1 if NSF or DFG funding; DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the German Research Foundation; NIH_EC, indicator = 1 if NIH or EC funding; EC,
European Commission; OtherGovFnd, indicator = 1 if other government funding; OtherFnd, indicator = 1 if funding other than government or industry; ResBasic,
my research is basic (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); ResInterd, my research area is interdisciplinary (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); ResRealW, my research is driven by
real-world problems, with or without commercial potential (1 to 5, 5 = strongly agree); ResReput, my reputation among academics is important to me (1 to 5, 5 =
strongly agree); Assistant, indicator = 1 if assistant professor; Associate, indicator =1 if associate professor; Male, indicator = 1 if male; Age, respondent age; AgeSq,
square of age; NumGroup, number of full-time researchers in research group; NumReport, number of researchers who report directly to respondent; Migrant,
indicator = 1 if not working in country of birth; BirthDevelop, indicator = 1 if birth country developed.
Part a Part b
Odds ratio t statistic P Odds ratio t statistic P
Norms OpenExch 1.108 2.79 0.005 1.103 2.76 0.006
Feedback 1.248 5.14 0.000 1.250 5.35 0.000
Acknowl 1.095 3.22 0.001 1.098 3.43 0.001
Commercial ResCommer 0.779 −8.13 0.000 0.779 −8.4 0.000
LStartup 0.890 −1.37 0.170 0.869 −1.70 0.089
LPatentAp 0.762 −5.48 0.000 0.770 −5.46 0.000
DIndustry 0.760 −3.39 0.001 0.779 −3.20 0.001
Competition CompOverall* 1.007 0.14 0.887
CompPub 0.845 −3.80 0.000 0.851 −4.88 0.000
CompGovFnd 1.070 1.57 0.116 1.084 2.06 0.039
CompStudents* 1.020 0.58 0.559
ResFunded 0.895 −3.57 0.000 0.889 −3.96 0.000
HighEsteem 0.872 −3.29 0.001 0.876 −3.31 0.001
GrpWW 0.992 −3.79 0.000 0.993 −3.66 0.000
Other GrpWWTrust 1.044 7.18 0.000 1.046 7.51 0.000
GrpWWCollab 0.973 −2.42 0.015 0.970 −2.77 0.006
DetectEasy* 1.000 0.01 0.995
ResLeader 1.115 3.07 0.002 1.096 2.83 0.005
Lpubs* 1.014 0.20 0.845
Lcites* 0.987 −0.33 0.739
NSF_DFG 1.197 2.58 0.01 1.198 2.71 0.007
NIH_EC* 0.965 −0.47 0.638
OtherGovFnd 0.862 −2.21 0.027 0.888 −1.84 0.066
OtherFnd* 0.995 −0.08 0.936
ResBasic 1.042 1.54 0.123 1.047 1.82 0.068
ResInterd* 1.008 0.22 0.826
continued on next page
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others follow the norms to be accompanied by a greater willingness to
openly disclose information before publication. The odds ratios for
open exchange, feedback, and acknowledgement are 1.103, 1.250, and
1.098, respectively. The aggregate odds ratio is 1.514 (the product of the
individual odds ratios); an increase by one unit in each measure of
norms is associated with a 0.514 increase in the odds of D relative to
ND or AD. In contrast, a competitive research environment is expected
to be associated with less disclosure. For competition variables, the odds
ratios for esteem, competition in publishing, number of competitors
(GrpWW), competition for government funding, and choice of research
topics based on likelihood of funding are 0.876, 0.851, 0.993, 1.084, and
0.889, respectively; the aggregate is 0.714. These results also confirm ex-
pectations that competition reduces disclosure, except for competition
for government funding. The NCC variables most studied in previous
work on one-to-one disclosing, those related to commercial orientation,
are also expected to reduce prepublication disclosure. The odds ratios
for patent applications, startups, industry funding, and research choice
with commercial potential are 0.770, 0.869, 0.779, and 0.779, respective-
ly; the aggregate is 0.406. Notably, the absolute value of the norms and
competition variables are not statistically significantly different, that is, a
unit increase in each of the norms variables is offset by a unit increase in
each of the competition variables. The absolute value of the commercial
effect is statistically significantly larger than that of the norms or com-
petition variables.
With regard to field differences, two points are important. First, we
tested for equivalence of each pair of field fixed effects (36 tests). The
fixed effect for computer science is significantly different (5% level) from
every other fixed effect, and in every case, there is less prepublication
disclosure by computer scientists. Further, with the exception of engi-
neering versus medical clinical (engineers disclose less: P = 0.036), in
no other comparison is there a statistically significant difference in fixed
effects. The 27 other regressors capture all field heterogeneity with the
exception of computer science (and the one case noted above) for which
there remains unobserved heterogeneity.
Second, the logit model assumes equal partial effects across fields.
We tested this assumption for each of the 12 NCC variables—a total
of 432 pairwise tests (for each pair of fields, we conduct 12 tests). Using
a 10% (5%) level of significance, we find that 11.34% (6.25%) of the tests
are significant. If the null of no difference is correct, then we expect 10%
(5%) of the comparisons to be significant. The difference between 10%
(5%) and 11.34% (6.25%) is not statistically significant (P = 0.156 and
0.0996).
Whereas ourmeasures of ND, AD, andD, as well as the NCC varia-
bles, are specific to the individual, in the next section, we show that in-
dividuals tend to bemore similar to others in their field than to those in
other fields with respect to the tension of norms with competition and
commercial orientation. Further, collectively, the NCC levels by field
statistically explain most of the variation in disclosing by fields. Finally,
field differences in behavior arising from the NCC variables are related
to differences in the levels of the variables instead of differences in re-
sponses to the variables (that is, responses captured by regression coef-
ficients; see the pairwise coefficient test results noted above).
Sensitivity analysis: The role of the NCC in field differences
To explore the role of the NCC variables in disclosing, we conduct two
sets of sensitivity analyses. Each analysis is based on the estimated
Part a Part b
Odds ratio t statistic P Odds ratio t statistic P
ResRealW 1.056 1.83 0.067 1.061 2.1 0.036
ResReput* 0.998 −0.04 0.965
Assistant 0.685 −2.96 0.003 0.678 −3.27 0.001
Associate 0.869 −1.57 0.117 0.842 −2.03 0.043
Male 1.079 1.06 0.291 1.051 0.71 0.475
Age 0.964 −1.40 0.162 0.958 −1.66 0.096
AgeSq 1.000 1.47 0.142 1.000 1.74 0.081
NumGroup* 1.002 0.65 0.515
NumReport* 1.002 0.52 0.606
Migrant 0.860 −1.86 0.063 0.859 −2.27 0.023
BirthDevelop* 1.058 0.48 0.628
SumResAreas 1.035 1.34 0.181 1.032 1.42 0.155
USSample 1.710 4.91 0.000 1.693 5.05 0.000
Field fixed effects Yes Yes
Number obs 4247 4445
Pseudo R-sq 0.084 0.082
*Variable is dropped from original regression due to t statistic less than 1 in absolute value.
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C
Fig. 3. Sensitivity analysis: Field differences. (A) Predicted probabilities of non-disclosing types: Base and hybrids. (B) Predicted probabilities of non-disclosing types:
Base and hybrids with computer science adjustment. (C) Predicted probabilities of non-disclosing types: NCC most and least conducive to disclosing.
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coefficients of our probability model (Table 1B). To provide a base of
reference for all of the sensitivity analyses, we compute the predicted
probability (pp) of being an ND for each respondent using the esti-
mated coefficients. Additional details are provided in the “Statistical
methods” section. The average pp by field is presented in the panels
labeled “Base” of Fig. 3 (A to C).
Field effects and NCC levels
In the first sensitivity analysis, we compute the average value of each
NCC variable by field. For each respondent in the sample, we replace
their individual NCC values with the average values of one of the fields
—we refer to these as “hybrid” individuals—and compute the pp of ND
for the hybrids. We then compute the average pp for each hybrid field.
For example, in one of the exercises, the average NCC values for engi-
neering replace each respondent’s actual NCC values. Our hybrids all
have the same NCC values (in this example, it is the average engineer’s
NCC), but they retain the original values of all other variables. The ex-
ercise is repeated using each field’s average NCC.
This exercise has 81 different results; for each of the nine sets of av-
erage NCC values, we have the average hybrid pp for each of the nine
fields. Figure 3A presents results. For example, the second panel of Fig.
3A (labeled “Eng NCC”) shows the average values of the pp of ND for
each field, where every individual has the NCC values of the average
engineer. Likewise, the third panel (“MedB NCC”) shows the average
ppwhen each respondent is given the average NCC of themedical basic
science respondents. Depending on which field’s NCC averages are
used, disclosing behavior is different. For example, excluding computer
science, the pp of ND for hybrids using engineering NCC averages
varies from 0.258 to 0.306, whereas hybrids using math have pp values
from 0.121 to 0.151.
Two features of Fig. 3A are striking. First, consistent with the fixed-
effects comparisons, computer science is an outlier. Regardless of the
NCC values used, the pp of the hybrid computer scientist is largest.
Computer scientists interviewed put forward the hypothesis that the
fixed effect comes from the fact that conference proceedings are their
preeminent publication outlet. Journal publications are often revised,
extended results or are reserved for reviews or compendia (27, 28).
For our computer science respondents, 68.6% of publications in the
previous 5 years were conference proceedings, compared to 36.3% for
engineering and less than 12% in other fields. To examine this hypoth-
esis on conference proceedings, we replaced the dependent variable in
the probabilitymodel first with responses to the general disclosing ques-
tion and second with responses to the withholding question. Computer
science continues to be an outlier in the first regression but not in the
second. This is consistent with the computer science fixed effect result-
ing from the role of conferences. If we set the fixed field effect for com-
puter science to the average level of the other fields, then computer
science is no longer an outlier (see Fig. 3B).
Second, there are substantial cross-panel differences, butwithinpanels,
the differences are small (except for computer science). The within and
cross-panel results suggest the importance of NCC values because across
panels, the NCC values differ, whereas within a panel, the NCC values
are the same. Note that all within-panel differences in pp across fields
are less than in the Base panel. The median difference among the base
predicted probabilities is 0.0725, and for the hybrids, it is 0.0224. This is
a reduction of 69.9%. Excluding computer sciences, the median reduc-
tion is 78.9%.
Relative effects of NCC variables
To examine the relative effects of norms, competition, and commercial
orientation on disclosing, we conduct a second set of sensitivity exer-
cises. Each respondent is successively given norm values that are most
and then least conducive to disclosing. For example, the norms variables
OpenExch, Feedback, and Acknowl are changed from actual (observed)
values to 5, which is the value of each variable that is most conducive to
disclosing. In the other norm exercise, we give each norm variable the
value 1, the value that is least conducive to disclosing. All other NCC
variables retain their observed values. This is followed by exercises in
which each respondent is given competition variable values most and
then least conducive to disclosing and commercial variable values most
and then least conducive to disclosing.
The results are shown in Fig. 3C. For comparison, we repeat in the
first panel the base probabilities fromFig. 3A.The secondpanel of Fig. 3C
report results when the norm values are most conducive to disclosing
(“Best Norms”). This is followed by an exercise in which we use values
of norms that are “worst” for disclosing (“WorstNorms”). This process is
continued for competition and commercialization (see the “Statistical
methods” section for details on values). In a final exercise, we use all
NCC values most and then least conducive to disclosing; results are in
the right-most panels of Fig. 3C.
Moving between least and most commercial has the largest ef-
fects on disclosing in comparison with norms and competition. If
all respondents were the most commercial, then five of the nine
fields would have more than 50% ND types and the other four
fields would be close. This is quite different from the worst norms
and most competitive regimes. Further, the least commercial orienta-
tion is closest to the “Best NCC” panel. Having the best norms shows
the least difference from the observed base case. For both the least
competitive and the least commercial, all but two cases (computer sci-
ence and engineering in the least competitive case) have fewer than
10% ND types.
Finally, there is very little variation across fields when all have the
same set of values for the NCC; this finding mirrors the effects noted
in the first set of sensitivity exercises.
Norms, competition, and commercialization
Field differences in disclosing behavior are largely correlated with dif-
ferences in the 12 NCC variables. Here, we present the levels of those
variables by field. To make comparisons, each variable is standardized
to have mean zero and variance one. We then extract the values for
the norms, commercial orientation, and competition variables by
field. The averages are presented in Fig. 4 (A to C). Figures S2 and S3
show the tests of differences across fields.What stands out in each is the
diversity across fields.
Figure 4A shows the standardized values for the norms variables.
The highest level of each norm is observed in mathematics followed
by physical sciences. The lowest levels are found inmedical school basic
sciences. These results are consistent with the result in Fig. 2 that math-
ematics and physical sciences have a significantly greater degree of dis-
closure to general audiences than medical basic sciences.
Figure 4B shows the results by field for the commercialization varia-
bles. The most commercial area is engineering, which is highest in
commercial orientation for all measures except the number of startups
(highest for computer science). The least commercial areas are social
science and mathematics. This is again consistent with the results re-
garding disclosing and non-disclosing types in engineering, social
sciences, and mathematics shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 4C shows the results for the competition variables. The high-
est average level of competition is in medical basic sciences, but on
examining the individual competition variables, that field is not highest
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C
Fig. 4. Standardized NCC values by field. (A) Standardized norms. (B) Standardized commercial orientation. (C) Standardized competition.
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for ResFunded or HighEsteem. The lowest levels of competition are in
the social sciences andmathematics (with the exception thatmathemat-
ics is highest for HighEsteem); note that these two fields are also lowest
in commercialization. Not coincidently, social sciences and mathemat-
ics have a greater degree of disclosure to general audiences thanmedical
basic science (Fig. 2).
DISCUSSION
According to the Mertonian norm of communalism, scientific results
belong to the community at large. This is the rationale for publishing
scientific output. More debated is the idea that research should be dis-
closed before publication. Reasons for prepublication secrecy include
the risk of being scooped, endangering patent filing, and, from the per-
spective of the scientific community, protection from results that would
not pass peer review. On the other hand, disclosure of preliminary
results may be necessary to find collaborators with complementary
skills, early feedback can improve the quality of eventual journal sub-
mission, early disclosure can avoid duplication of science, and publica-
tion lags suggest that disclosing prepublication may speed the progress
of science. Current debates on the pros and cons of prepublication
disclosure occur against a backdrop of little systematic research on
prepublication disclosure—how frequently it occurs and the factors
involved.
We examine prepublication disclosure to general audiences across
a wide array of fields and find that, except for engineering and com-
puter science, disclosure is more common than not (as measured both
by disclosure of a paper and our index of disclosing types), but there is
substantial variation across fields, with social scientists and mathema-
ticians being the most likely to disclose. Notably, the life scientists are
not the least likely to disclose. As shown in Fig. 1A, in percentage terms,
once they are sure of validity, medical basic and medical clinical scien-
tists are more likely to disclose than mathematicians.
One result of our econometric analysis of disclosing types stands
out. It appears that field differences in disclosing do not stem from
differences in responses to changes in NCC values; rather, they arise
largely from different levels of the NCC variables by field. Further, these
level differences account for about 70% of the variation across fields.
Note that if more prepublication disclosure is preferred (from a societal
standpoint), then our results suggest that the goal might be achieved by
concentrating on norms, competition, and commercialization.
As for why one would disclose, obtaining feedback is the most im-
portant reason in every field. Although deterrence is the least important,
a considerable number of researchers consider deterrence when decid-
ing to disclose prepublication. In the more formulaic fields, scientists
often present before publication to attract competitors towork indepen-
dently on a problem while at the same time wanting to deter work on
their part of the problem.This viewof competition is inmarked contrast
to a racing model where scientists fear being scooped by competitors.
Moreover, it is the formulaic fields where prepublication disclosure to
obtain credit is more prevalent.
The results on attracting others are thought-provoking.Althoughwe
can conjecture, we do not know why the respondents want to attract
others. The motivation could be similar to that for credit. As scientists
in our presurvey interviews suggested, the scientist may want credit for
discovering a problem not yet solved—perhaps a new direction for the
field so that they might be thought of as a research leader—or the mo-
tivation may be similar to that for attracting collaborators (29); the sci-
entist may want scientists with complementary skills to work on the
problem regardless of collaboration (30). More generally, the impor-
tance of both “attraction” motives (to collaborate and to work on the
problem) suggests that government funding policies meant to encour-
age collaboration may increase prepublication disclosure. This hypoth-
esis may explain the somewhat anomalous positive correlation of
competition for government funding and the probability of disclosure.
Is this an unintended consequence of such policies? Are such conse-
quences important to consider in evaluating the policies (31)?
It is important to recognize our results as descriptive rather than
prescriptive. We make no welfare statements about prepublication
disclosure. There are well-known risks to those who disclose, and Fig. 1B
highlights fear of being scooped as a consideration in the disclosure
decision. Further, the disclosure of unrefereed results may have un-
desirable effects. Attracting collaborators with complementary skills,
ceteris paribus, should increase scientific progress in the attracting
field but only if the increased output outweighs collaboration costs.
To some, the term “deterrence” might have negative connotations,
but recall that the data we present pertain to deterrence from the part
of the problem researched by the presenter. This behavior is beneficial if
it reduces unnecessary duplication of effort, but we make no judgment.
The same can be said of attracting others to the field. Although it is
tempting to think of that as socially desirable, examining the optimal
size or rate of progress in a field is beyond our scope.
Future research directions include examining the welfare effects
of prepublication disclosure. These studies might include relating what
is disclosed and stage of disclosure to community benefits. For example,
recent field experiments in computational biology (5) have shown sig-
nificant benefits from disclosure of intermediate results for subsequent
reuse by others. Although we reported the stage of disclosure of results
such as web postings, preprints, and conferences, we did not explore the
extent to which data, materials, or algorithms were disclosed. Another
worthy avenue is to examine the extent to which disclosure restrictions
or grants of access to use is also warranted (32). This topic is related to
an old stream of research by legal scholars on disclosure in patenting,
which restricts reuse (33).Our results also suggest that there is stillmuch
that we do not know not only about prepublication disclosure but also
about the NCC variables we examine. Is there something about the sci-
entific production function in these fields that shapes differences in
norms and competition? For example, what is the role of capital inten-
sity? Further, are observed levels optimal for the production of science,
or are they due to exogenous reasons and path dependence?What is the
interplay among competition, norms, and commercialization in open-
ness and progress of science?
One point we have not addressed is the extent that individuals are
attracted to a field based on openness before publication. While it may
well be the case that individuals are attracted (or repelled) according to
levels of competition and/or commercial orientation, and possibly the
norms in a field, we are not convinced that this alters any interpretation
of our results. It still remains, regardless of selection into fields, that
some fields disclose more than others, and this is highly correlated with
the NCC levels of the fields. Selection into fields, however, would affect
the levels of the NCC variables.
METHODS
Survey and publication data
We conducted a survey in 2014 of active researchers regarding pre-
publication disclosing of research results. The survey was email-based.
Email addresses were obtained from department and school websites at
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121 universities in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland. The
survey was sent to 81,406 email addresses, and 5643 (6.9%) bounced
back as invalid. The reason, we believe, for the high percent of invalid
addresses is that many departments include addresses of graduate stu-
dents and post docs alongside faculty addresses. Many of those that
bounced back were likely students and post docs who had left their
institutions between the time we collected the addresses and the time
of the survey.
The remaining 75,763 were valid addresses. Of these, 872 were iden-
tified as no longer appropriate for the survey primarily because they had
retired, they had moved entirely to administration, or we were notified
that they had passed away. This left 74,891, of whom 7263 (9.7%) com-
pleted the survey and 1803 (2.4%) partially completed the survey. Re-
spondents were assured that their responses would remain confidential.
The overall response rate was 12.1%. The response rate for the U.S.
sample is 12.5%, and the European rate is 11.2%. These are statisti-
cally significantly different (P = 0.000).
The survey was intended for active researchers; thus, we exclude
from our analysis the 700 respondents who do not self-identify as ac-
tive researchers. Although the survey included graduate students, post
docs, and research scientists, we consider here only the 7103 respon-
dents who hold faculty rank: 19.9% are assistant professors, 24.2% are
associate professors, and 55.9% are professors. U.S. respondents are
89.6% of respondents, 7.9% are in Germany, and the remaining 2.4%
are in Switzerland.
Publications and citation data
We obtained from Scopus the total number of publications and cita-
tions for each respondent; coverage includes conference proceedings,
articles in press, and journal publications. We were able to find publi-
cation and citation records for 92.6% of respondents. We exclude any
whose records could not be found; these include, obviously, those with
zero publications, but we also know that some (most likely themajority)
are failures to find Scopus records rather than zero publications. Drop-
ping those with zero publications is not considered an important prob-
lembecausewewish to restrict attention to active researchers.We tested
whether the failure to find records is significantly related to a respon-
dent’s disclosing type [disclosers (D), ambivalent disclosers (AD), or
non-disclosers (ND)], and we did not find a statistically significant re-
lationship (P = 0.379). We did, however, find a significant relationship
between field andmissing Scopus records (P = 0.000). The percent with
missing records ranges from 3.5% in computer science (followed by en-
gineering at 4.5%) to 13.5% in social sciences (followed by physical
sciences at 11.5%).
Field categorization
We categorize respondents in nine department/school affiliations: agri-
culture, biological sciences, computer science, engineering, mathe-
matics, medical school basic sciences, medical school clinical, physical
sciences, and social sciences. Respondents in schools of agriculture who
are in agricultural engineering are classified in engineering rather than
in agriculture, and those in agricultural economics or agricultural busi-
ness are classified in social sciences. Statisticians and biostatisticians are
classified in mathematics. In most cases, assignment to a field is simple;
however, where affiliation was unclear (for example, some respondents
are found in Department of Mathematics and Computer Science), we
examined keywords provided by respondents to describe their research.
Nonetheless, there are likely errors that remain. As a check on our di-
vision of medical school faculty into basic sciences and clinical depart-
ments, we examined responses to a question regarding whether
respondent agreed that their work was basic. More than 73% of those
identified with medical school basic science departments agreed or
strongly agreed that their work is basic. For those in clinical depart-
ments, the fraction was 38.2%.
Tests for response bias
Comparing response by field
We compared the response rate for engineering with that ofmathemat-
ics. These are chosen because the willingness to disclose by respondent
is markedly different in these two fields; thus, we might expect the will-
ingness to take the survey to be different across these fields. After drop-
ping those for which the email bounced back as invalid, there are 16,720
engineers and mathematicians who received the survey, of whom
10,599 are engineers (63.4%) and 6720 are mathematicians (36.6%).
The response rate is statistically significantly higher for mathematicians
(13.9%) than for engineers (12.5%). The P value for the difference is
0.008. The lower rate for engineers is not surprising given that,
among respondents, there is a substantially higher fraction of non-
discloser types.
Comparing response in terms of Scopus publications
In another series of tests, we compared publications and citations be-
tween respondents and nonrespondents. We used cluster random
sampling to draw a sample of 300 nonresponding academics. Clus-
tering was based on the geographic distribution of our respondents.
We then attempted tomatch these with Scopus publication data. Some
could not be matched. This occurs, in part, from the fact that not all
academics have publications (and our survey is intended for active
researchers only). We did not find a match for 30 U.S. academics,
5 German academics, and 1 Swiss academic. We further lost four
U.S. and one German observation due to errors in the download file.
Two hundred fifty-nine remain in our sample (86% of the original
300). The geographic distribution is 215 U.S., 30 German, and 14 Swiss
observations.
Tests of differences in publications and citations do not suggest that
respondents are different from nonrespondents. The number of pub-
lications by respondent in the 5 years before the survey is as follows:
respondent average, 19.9; nonrespondent average, 21.5; P value in test
of difference, 0.4439. The number of citations to publications in 5 years
before the survey is as follows: respondent average, 179; nonrespondent
average, 207; P value in test of difference, 0.1950. The average cites to
publications in 5 years before the survey are as follows: respondents,
2.33; nonrespondents, 2.62; P value in test of difference, 0.2609. The
average number of coauthors in 5 years before the survey is as follows:
respondents, 5.08; nonrespondents, 5.03; P value in test of differ-
ence, 0.8995.
Comparing response by early versus late respondents
We tested for potential nonresponse bias by comparing the answers
to questions from the first wave of respondents with the last wave
of respondents. Our analysis compares the first 10% of respondents
to the last 10%. We tested whether the fraction of disclosing types
(D, AD, or ND) are statistically significantly different between the
early and late disclosers. We also tested whether these two groups
differ in terms of our variables for competition, commercialization,
and norms. Differences are not statistically different at conventional
levels.
Comparing responses of those who started the survey but did
not complete to the ones who finished the survey
Comparing these two groups, we found no significant difference in
terms of the share of AD types (P = 0.328). However, we find weakly
significant (P = 0.096) that the respondents who did not complete the
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
Thursby et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar2133 16 May 2018 11 of 14
 o
n
 M
arch 17, 2020
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
survey aremore likely ND types.We find a strong significant effect (P =
0.014) for the ones who finished to be more likely D types. However,
comparing the likelihood of completing a survey across fields does not
suggest that, in fields with a large share of non-disclosers, respondents
tend to be less likely to complete the survey. For example, engineering,
the field with the largest share of ND types, ranges exactly in themiddle
of all fields in terms of the frequency of completes.
Validation of respondent disclosing type
Respondent disclosing type was determined by self-identification with
regards to general disclosure and withholding. As is generally the case
with self-identified characteristics, there can be concerns about validity
of the measure. We considered validity in three ways. We first compared
our classification of disclosing type into D, AD, or ND with whether re-
spondents disclosed prepublication results of an identified recent paper.
Second, we compared our classification of respondents into disclosing
type with disclosing with trusted colleagues. Finally, we compared
disclosing type with disclosure when a specific request is made to
respondent for materials, data, etc. In each case, we find a positive as-
sociation between our classification of disclosing type (D, AD, andND)
and these other disclosing-related situations; details follow.
Identified paper comparison
We asked respondents to identify a recently published result in an im-
portant, overarching area of their research and to indicate whether they
had openly disclosed the result before publication. In asking respon-
dents to identify specific incidents, inferences fromstereotypical answers
or received opinions as well as vague opinions are reduced (34, 35). Re-
spondents’ answers are more concrete when tied to specific projects or
situations. In allowing respondents to decidewhat incidents they report,
respondents are better in recalling situations, and it reduces the bias of
researchers to preselect incidences. Because respondents may tend to
select projects or situations that are important to them, we may not
catch the full heterogeneity of the general population. Slightlymore than
86% of D types disclosed the paper prepublication, whereas only 39.2%
of ND types did so. AD types are in the middle (67.6% disclosed).
Recall that disclosing type is determined by the responses to two
questions: (i) How often they present to general audiences and (ii) how
often they withhold crucial parts when presenting. Response to each
question is also significantly correlated with concerns of being scooped
for the identified paper. The partial correlation of concern with part a
(holding constant the response to part b) is −0.13, and the partial cor-
relation of concern with part b (holding constant the response to part a)
is 0.31; both are significantly different from zero (P = 0.0000). We view
these results and those of the prior paragraph as strong support for the
validity of our disclosing type measures.
Trusted colleague comparison
We asked respondents about disclosing prepublication results with
trusted colleagues. Table S1 (parts c and d) shows the responses to
disclosingwith andwithholding from trusted colleagues. In ourpresurvey
interviews, we found researchers to be comfortable with the idea of
trusted colleagues and our definition of a trusted colleague. A trusted
colleague is defined as “an individual outside your research group to
whom you could provide confidential information and be sure that it
is not passed on or used to compete with you.” Research group is de-
fined as a “group of individuals performing research and/or develop-
ment under common supervision and/or mentorship.”
Respondents are divided into three disclosing types according to
disclosing with and withholding from trusted colleagues. D-T types
are respondents who often or very often disclose with trusted colleagues
and who never or rarely withhold crucial parts. ND-T types are those
who never or rarely disclose with trusted colleagues and/or often or very
oftenwithhold from trusted colleagues. AD-T types consist of all others.
ND-T types comprise 7.9% of the sample (compare to 23.9% for ND
types for general disclosing), AD-T types are 27.4% of the sample (AD
types are 38.9% of the sample), and D-T types are 64.8% of the sample
(D types are 37.2% of the sample). Not surprisingly, disclosing with
trusted colleagues is much more common than disclosing with gen-
eral audiences and withholding from trusted colleagues is much less
common.
When we examined the intersection of general and trusted disclosing
types, we found a positive and statistically significant (P = 0.000) associ-
ation between disclosing types. The simple correlation of individual types
is 0.4 (where ND, AD, and D types are coded 0, 1, and 2, respectively; we
similarly code trusted types). The crosstab shows that 32.9% are both D
and D-T types, 13.6% are both AD and AD-T types, and 5.4% are both
ND and ND-T types. Slightly over half the sample (50.9%) exhibits the
same disclosing behavior for both general and trusted colleagues. Further,
41.6% of the respondents exhibit more disclosing with trusted than with
general colleagues. In general, those who disclose with general colleagues
disclosewith trusted colleagues, and thosewhodonot disclose tendnot to
disclose with either group.
Figure S4A shows the stage of disclosing to trusted colleagues by
field of the identified paper discussed above. Figure S4B shows ND-T
types by field. For comparison, the figure repeats the fraction NS for
general disclosing. The fractions of ND and ND-T follow similar
patterns; the simple correlation between the field fractions is 0.819 (sig-
nificantly different from zero at conventional levels).
Requests for materials comparison
Finally, in our survey, we also asked respondents about their recent
experiences with requests for research materials or results. This dis-
closing, which we call specific disclosing because it involves a specific
request to the respondent, has been shown to be very different from
the general disclosing that is the focus above (17). We asked them to
“think back to the most recent request from someone outside your
research group.” For that request, we asked for the approximate per-
centage of information or material they had provided. The average
percentage of the specific request provided by D types is 88.1%, for
AD types it is 80.5%, and for ND types it is 74.3% (each is statistically
significantly different from the others with P values less than 0.004).
Figure S4C shows the fraction of requests provided by ND and D
types across fields.
Statistical methods
We used an ordered logit model relating the probability of respondent
type (ND,AD, orD coded 0, 1, or 2, respectively) to variables thought to
be related to disclosing as well as field fixed effects to account for un-
observed heterogeneity.We then constructed a series of sensitivity exer-
cises to explore the extent towhich field differences are due to differences
in NCC variables.
The estimated probability model can be used to calculate each
respondent’s predicted probability of ND, AD, or D. For example,
if P(Yi = ND) is the probability that person i is type ND, then
PðYi ¼ NDÞ ¼ f ðX′1ib1 þ X′2ib2Þ
where the function f is the logistic probability distribution, vector
X1i contains the 12 NCC (norms, competition, and commercialization)
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variables, and the vector X2i contains all other variables. The pp of ND
for person i is
P^ iðNDÞ ¼ f ðX′1ib^1 þ X′2ib^2Þ
where b^1 and b^2 are the estimated values of the unknown coefficients.
We can retrieve the probabilities for respondents in some fieldA and
compute that field’s average probability of ND that we denote by
P^AAðNDÞ. Note that these probabilities are not the same as the fraction
of disclosing types in the raw data (in part due to the fact that the re-
gression is based on the subset of respondents for whom all variables are
observed), although the values are very close; for example, in the raw
data, the fractions of ND for engineering and biological sciences are
0.353 and 0.190, respectively, and the average pp values are 0.320 and
0.199. As shown in the leftmost panel of Fig. 3A (labeled Base), P^AAðNDÞ
ranges from 0.133 in social sciences to 0.379 in computer science. The
range of D types is 0.511 in social sciences to 0.214 in computer sci-
ence. There are 36 possible pairs of fields, and themedian difference in
pp for each pair of fields for the Base case is 0.073 (the mean is 0.095).
Using the predicted probabilities of ND, we conducted the following
sensitivity exercise. We selected some field and computed the average
value of each of the 12 NCC variables for that field. For each person in
the sample, we replaced their individual NCC values with these average
values and then recomputed the pp. We refer to these as our hybrid
individuals. That is
P^ iAðNDÞ ¼ f ðX′1Ab^1 þ X′2ib^2Þ
whereX1A is the vector of average NCC variables for field A. Note that
we used the estimates of b1 and b2 reported in Table 1B. From this, we
extracted the average predicted probabilities for each field. Thus, we can
compute the average NCC values for engineering and use these as the
NCCvalues for every person.Our hybrids all have the sameNCCvalues
(the average engineer’s NCC), but they retain the original values of all
other variables.
For each of the nine sets of average NCC values, we have nine sets of
average predicted probabilities. For example, in Fig. 3A, the second pan-
el, labeled “EngNCC,” shows the average value of the pp of ND for each
of the nine fields in the sensitivity exercise, where every individual has
the NCC values of the average engineer.
To examine the impact of norms versus competition versus com-
mercial orientation, we conducted a second series of sensitivity
exercises. Each respondent was successively given norms variable values
that are most and then least conducive to disclosing, competition var-
iable values most and then least conducive to disclosing, and commer-
cial variable values most and then least conducive to disclosing. For
example, for the norms exercises, OpenExch, Feedback, and Acknowl
were changed from actual (observed) values to 5; these are the values
most conducive to disclosing. Note that this exercise provides more ev-
idence on disclosing than the odds ratios reported above because it
moves each respondent to the extreme values in the sample.
Formost competitive, we setCompPub,ResFunded, andHighEsteem
each to 5, whereas CompGovFnd was set to 1 (because greater compe-
tition for government funding leads to more disclosing). GrpWW was
set to 51, andGrpWWTrust andGrpWWCollabwere based on the ratio
of the average of these variables to the average ofGrpWW (14.3 and 6.7,
respectively). For the least competitive case, CompPub, ResFunded,
andHighEsteem were each set to 1, whereas CompGovFnd is set to 5.
GrpWW is set to 0, and GrpWWTrust and GrpWWCollab were each
set to 0. For most commercial, ResCommer is set to 5 and DIndustry
was set to 1. LStartUp and LPatentAp are set to the 90th percentile of
those with startups and patent applications. For least commercial,
ResCommerwas set to 1, andDIndustry, LStartUp, and LPatentApwere
each set to 0.
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